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Intellectual Property Rights Systems
and the Assemblage of Local
Knowledge Systems
Saskia Vermeylen,* George Martin,** and Roland Clift***
Abstract: The mounting loss of the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples
presents environmental as well as ethical issues. Fundamental among these is the
sustainability of indigenous societies and their ecosystems. Although the com-
mercial expropriation of traditional knowledge grows, rooted in a global, corpo-
rate application of intellectual property rights (IPRs), the survival of indigenous
societies becomes more problematic. One reason for this is an unresolved con-
flict between two perspectives. In the modernist view, traditional knowledge is a
tool to use (or discard) for the development of indigenous society, and therefore
it must be subordinated to Western science. Alternatively, in the postmodernist
view, it is harmonious with nature, providing a new paradigm for human ecol-
ogy, and must be preserved intact. We argue that this encumbering polarization
can be allayed by shifting from a dualism of traditional and scientific knowledge
to an assemblage of local knowledge, which is constituted by the interaction of
both in a third space. We argue that IPR can be reconfigured to become the
framework for creating such a third space.
THE FATE OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
The knowledge systems of indigenous peoples are getting increasing attention from
environmentalists and researchers. One view of these systems is that they are in
harmony with nature and offer a model of human ecology. For others, traditional
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knowledge is a promising contributor to development, especially because north-
ern knowledge systems have largely failed in their applications to southern pov-
erty. Renewed interest in traditional knowledge also flows from the discourses of
sustainable development and biodiversity conservation.1
Traditional knowledge has always been available to the larger world, but in re-
cent years its fate becomes problematic. Advances in biogenetics, accompanied by
the global marketing of drugs derived from indigenous usage, have multiplied the
potential commercial value of flora. Developments in ethnobotany and medical
botany have produced a potentially heady brew for the pharmaceutical industry.
As flora acquires commercial value, there is a risk of its overexploitation, leading
to extinction of species and loss of biodiversity. Exploitation is also a challenge to
the continued traditional use of indigenous knowledge and thereby threatens the
social integrity of indigenous peoples—perhaps leading to a loss of human diversity.
The growing appropriation of traditional knowledge throws up a number of
political, environmental, legal, and ethical issues. For example, it draws new at-
tention to intellectual property law: Are private property rights over biogenetic
knowledge justifiable? How should society balance public versus private control
over the intellectual commons of nature? Can an indigenous culture survive in
the face of market forces disembedding its knowledge of nature?2
There is a central contradiction involved in the fate of traditional knowledge:
the disjuncture between the present status of indigenous peoples and the charac-
ter of their traditional knowledge. In terms of their contemporary social, eco-
nomic, and political status, many nomadic indigenous peoples around the globe,
as a result of increasing contact with the postcolonial world, are or are becoming
sedentary agriculturalists and semiproletarian farm laborers. However, their knowl-
edge base remains substantially rooted in their original livelihoods. Thus, indig-
enous peoples struggle to find a way to use and protect their traditional knowledge
in changed circumstances.
To address the fate of traditional knowledge, this article focuses on its current
status, particularly in relation to international property (IP) law. Specifically, we
address the inferior and alienated position traditional knowledge occupies relative
to scientific knowledge within the discourse of intellectual property rights (IPRs).
Traditional knowledge fares better in sociological and feminist discourses, which
focus on identifying the common nuances which can serve to bridge scientific and
traditional worldviews.3 Our approach is similarly focused on bridging this gap.
We argue that to protect traditional knowledge from further exploitation or ex-
tinction it is important to contextualize Western science and traditional knowl-
edge. We argue that Western European science is a particular, standardized form
of local knowledge produced by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth cen-
tury. It was then universalized through colonialist and capitalist practices of knowl-
edge production and ownership. During this period traditional knowledge was
defined as a product of witchcraft, superstition, and heresy. It was marginalized
and its social value was considerably undermined. Beginning under late colonial-
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ism, field research by ecologists, anthropologists, and others helped to reestablish
its academic credibility. In recent years this process of renewal of traditional knowl-
edge may have reached a new stage. Western scientists who led this effort did so
within a historic atmosphere of colonial derision and neglect. In their struggle to
reestablish traditional knowledge, they stressed its unique nature.
At the current juncture, in which indigenous peoples are striving to reestablish
rights over their traditional knowledge in national and international forums, the
emphasis on its uniqueness can be counterproductive. In contrast, in other dis-
courses, such as science and technology studies (STS), traditional and scientific
knowledge can be conceptualized as local knowledges. Actor Network Theory can
be used to connect the various modes of knowledge production in assemblages.
We suggest that the application of the logic of assemblages has implications for
IPR.
Although this article explores conceptual definitions of knowledge, it has been
inspired and informed by empirical research carried out with the San in Southern
Africa (July–November 2004, July–September 2005, June–August 2007). This re-
search was part of a larger project that examined the San’s stance toward IPR and
the commercialization of their traditional knowledge, which was sparked by the
hoodia benefit-sharing agreement. The San of the Kalahari have chewed the suc-
culent, Hoodia gordonii, for millennia on long hunts. It is a thirst quencher and
appetite suppressant. A patent was awarded to South Africa’s Council for Scien-
tific and Industrial Research in 1998 without the knowledge and consent of the
San. After a campaign for their rights, a deal was struck so that the San could
benefit from the commercialization of the slimming aid, P57, the active ingredient
developed from hoodia.4
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Intellectual property rights draws attention to a central question: How does one
define traditional knowledge? Even scholars who have devoted careers to studying
non-Western knowledge systems struggle to define traditional knowledge.5 The
institutions6 looking for appropriate protection mechanisms for traditional knowl-
edge are failing to provide terminological clarity.7 Amid this definitional uncer-
tainty, one strand of scholars (mostly anthropologists) has argued that traditional
knowledge belongs to specific ethnic groups or the cultural heritage of minority
groups.8 Framing traditional knowledge in this manner (i.e., as something con-
nected to a particular space, time, and people) is a continuation of the need to
differentiate it from Western or scientific knowledge, which is seen as a cause for
its exploitation. The work of Posey is exemplary of this argument.9
Posey was one of the first scholars to draw attention to the concept of bio-
prospecting, and he identified a connection between the role of anthropologists
and the commercial exploitation of indigenous peoples’ knowledge. He argued that
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEMS 203
there was a real danger that traditional knowledge as recorded by anthropologists
could be legally expropriated by companies without acknowledging its indigenous
roots. Posey sought to protect traditional knowledge by defining it as the opposite
of scientific knowledge: “for indigenous peoples, knowledge is viewed as emanat-
ing from a spiritual—not a unilinear scientific—base. Thus, all Creation is sacred,
and the sacred and secular are inseparable.”10
Although Posey recognized the need for indigenous peoples to protect their tra-
ditional knowledge, he argued that it would be difficult to use IPR to achieve this
goal. He saw IPR as a new form of exploitation in the long history of colonial
subjugation of indigenous peoples—a concept which he called genetic terra nul-
lius.11 He also wrote that IPR was inadequate and inappropriate for the protection
of traditional knowledge because it recognizes individual and not collective rights;
requires a specific act of intervention; stimulates commercialization; recognizes
only market values; is subject to economic powers and manipulation; is difficult
to monitor; and is expensive, complicated, and time consuming.12 Posey’s view
that IP law poses a threat to the cultural integrity and rights of indigenous peo-
ples was taken further by other scholars, who argued that it also undermines their
territorial and resource rights. Thus, it has become a widely held view that con-
ventional IPR should not be applied to traditional knowledge.13
Much of the current discourse about bioprospecting emphasizes the incompat-
ibility between traditional knowledge and IPR by engaging with a position that
(a) highlights the uniqueness of traditional knowledge that is culturally bound in
space and time; (b) emphasizes the oppositional traits of traditional and scientific
knowledge in the ways in which they are generated, recorded, and transmitted;
and (c) classifies the two into separate categories with regard to how culture and
nature are related.
However, the current understanding of traditional knowledge has been produced
within a specific set of assumptions and objectives.14 In most cases, the term tra-
ditional knowledge is used not only to describe a category of knowledge but also to
carry particular political messages, including criticizingWestern approaches to de-
velopment, protecting the environment of a particular group, and highlighting an
exploitative Western stance toward nature. A combination of these political agen-
das is used in the bioprospecting or biopiracy literature.15 Although we do not ques-
tion the substance of these political messages, we do suggest that it is now timely to
revisit the discourse which sustains a dualism between modernism and tradition-
alism. Our position has developed out of the research with the San, which has re-
vealed that this group of indigenous peoples are not a priori opposed to the
commercialization of their traditional knowledge or to its protection through IPR.16
Another look at the Western/traditional dichotomy of knowledge, combined with
an examination of the literature in the new commodification discourse may open a
new chapter in the debate about IPR and traditional knowledge.17
The work of Sunder stands out in current debates about the fate of traditional
knowledge. She argues that “reifying the public domain may have the unin-
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tended effect of congealing traditional knowledge as the opposite of property,
presenting poor peoples’ knowledge as the raw material of innovation—ancient,
static and natural—rather than as intellectual property—modern, dynamic, sci-
entific, and cultural invention.”18 Following Sunder’s logic, we argue that the
initial academic emphasis on the uniqueness of traditional knowledge has be-
come counter-productive, adding to a situation wherein it is increasingly prob-
lematic that indigenous peoples can protect their knowledge (with IPR).19
Although this proposition is a reconfirmation of Sunder, we hope to further the
debate by drawing attention to a social construction of science as local knowl-
edge, and by questioning the extent to which science is uniquely dynamic, inno-
vative, and evolving.
International institutions like the Convention on Biological diversity and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) promote definitions that
stress oppositional knowledge systems. This has repercussions for another de-
bate: how traditional knowledge should be protected to preserve biological and
cultural diversity. Although historical and social studies recognize the fluidity and
permeability of knowledge and the cultural hybridity of innovation, law re-
inforces cultural boundaries by locating traditional knowledge in a fixed time
and space.20 Both law and science strive to detach knowledge from its local, or-
ganic social base and fit it into categorical abstractions. Both underestimate how
their common framing template—the Enlightenment—continues to influence
them.
This dualistic thinking about scientific and traditional knowledge within the
IPR framework—useful as opposed to useless, obvious as opposed to opaque, and
innovative as opposed to static—has its roots in the Enlightenment. Revisiting the
history of ideas is particularly relevant for an IPR audience. The contemporary
strand of Enlightenment thinking—the modernist discourse—continues to have
considerable influence, as exemplified by the approach taken in the rediscovery of
traditional knowledge in conservationist and environmental discourses.
MODERNIST AND POSTMODERNIST VIEWS
OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
As illustrated from Sillitoe’s analysis of the literature, conventional wisdom usu-
ally depicts science as more rational, theoretical, and evidence-based in compari-
son to traditional knowledge.21
Whether or not there is substantive validity to these descriptive distinctions be-
tween indigenous and scientific knowledge, the typological method serves to ex-
aggerate them, in much the same way that group stereotypes sharpen a few selected
characteristics of human groups. Although it may be recognized that there is a
diversity of knowledge traditions around the world, modern Western science is
the epistemological standard.22
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Pottier argues it is the positivist view that knowledge is unitary and system-
atized, which explains why modern scientists regard their method as superior to
traditional knowledge.23 Other defining characteristics have been attributed to this
positivist framework—that it emphasizes competition rather than cooperation, fo-
cuses on the individual rather than on the collective, and stresses regulation rather
than responsibilities.24
During the Age of Reason knowledge production was deemed inefficient and
overly based in subjective imageries. Experience was to be framed in a more me-
chanical, universal, and objective manner; and the emphasis in knowledge cre-
ation shifted towards the individual. The successes of Bacon, Descartes, and Newton
offered a new way of producing knowledge, which was later tied to Hume’s em-
piricism. Perceptions of individual scientists became increasingly important at the
expense of community experiences in the process of knowledge production. In
the quest for certitude, science—in this logical positivist form—separated itself
from other forms of knowledge production.
This way of thinking about science had repercussions in the way society and
politics were perceived. Locke and other Enlightenment thinkers universalized Eu-
ropean society and its socioeconomic and political infrastructures by separating
themselves from non-Europeans who were encountered in the spread of Western
colonialism. Indigenous peoples were considered less advanced, and the Enlight-
enment assessed how far they were removed from achieving European civiliza-
tion. The belief in the progress of humanity to a cosmopolitan and rational
perfection gave Locke and company the authority to demean non-Europeans, who
were at risk of being stuck in a lower state of development.25
Emergent social science was fully stamped with the Enlightenment worldview,
because it developed a technocratic approach steeped in universal laws of behav-
ior; “from then on, social science portrayed the study of a particular place as one
that produced a deficient version of knowledge.”26 European civilization, through
colonialism, universalized its assets, and linked its raison d’être to the purported
inferiority of those outside it. A prime means by which this was accomplished was
through systematically minimizing and distorting traditional knowledge.
The modern individual took form as opposed to its antithesis—the savage. “In
order to define ‘us’ there must be a corresponding ‘them’ against ‘we’ come to rec-
Subject Traditional Knowledge Scientific Knowledge
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ognise ourselves as different.”27 The Enlightenment embraced Plato’s dualist epis-
temology wherein the mind gains true knowledge to the degree that it separates
from the body. This was a basis for a theoretical paradigm in which knowledge of
the truth depended on a separation from its opposite.28 The process of creating
a universal modernity could be achieved only when the savage was included—
but circumscribed as well. The indigenous were destined to perpetually strive for
the status of the modern and were denied any alternative status on the basis of
their intrinsic difference. Thus, modernity’s ordered and deterministic worldview
emerged in its opposition to the spontaneity and mimetic responsiveness of
tradition.
Although the colonial conquest was built on the economic, political, and social
dispossession of non-Western cultures, it also resulted in an epistemic erosion for
these cultures. Most modern scientists shared the racist views of the European
colonialists. The father of modern Western science, Bacon, conceptualized mod-
ern science as the “production of facts that were useful for the effective conquer-
ing of the physical universe, alien cultures, alien peoples, and alternative knowledge
systems.”29 Bacon rejected all previous scientific traditions and imposed a new
form of scientific knowledge that was equated with power and domination. The
concept of knowledge as power meant for Bacon that with proper science it was
possible for the “European white man” to manipulate nature to maximize a ma-
terial exploitation of the natural world.30
Thus, from the outset the Enlightenment and its modernist project were steeped
in a dualist discourse: preaching enlightenment, scientific rationality, and human-
ism but at the same time practicing violence and irrationality. How does modern-
ist dualism relate to postmodernist views of traditional knowledge?
Postmodernism shares some of the methods of modernism but its substance is
different. “We Westerners are absolutely different from Others!” is the moderns’
victory cry, or protracted lament.31 This great divide continues to obsess. The sav-
age has become the other and is now used to highlight how it once was for West-
ern societies, a process labelled as “a lament of falsely re-collective nostalgia for
some lost sense of spiritualism, family, place [and] unity.”32 This sort of thinking
is found in the conservationist discourse in which indigenous peoples are por-
trayed as existing in harmony with a pristine world. It is assumed, because indig-
enous peoples now have, and have had in the past, a relatively small ecological
affect, that they are in harmony with nature. This has been called the “myth of
ecological wisdom” by Milton.33 The reality is that indigenous peoples have al-
ways altered their environments, including extinguishing species—that their small
ecological footprints have been in part the product of low populations.
There is a danger that such an idealized authenticity, for which postmodernity
longs, imposes an unjustifiable burden on indigenous peoples: re-traditionalism.
Although it mirrors outside expectations, it also inhibits the capacity to recreate a
sustainable society from within. An example of re-traditionalization is the Khwe
San revival of hunting. Even though hunting is forbidden by the game park status
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of their West Caprivi (Namibia) homeland, the Khwe emphasize the importance
of hunting with bow and arrow as a main feature of their heritage. This may be a
disservice to their efforts to preserve their society and knowledge in the new world
in which they now live. There is a risk that the Khwe will become occupants of an
indigenous theme park, rather than of the post–hunter-gatherer world that sur-
rounds them. Like the Khwe, many indigenous peoples now live in dramatically
changed circumstances.34
In summary, both modernist and postmodernist views tend to rely on a cat-
egorical partition of indigenous knowledge. In science, it often is seen only as a
resource of testable data. In the alternative noble-other vision, it is seen through a
back to the future lens. The result is that, despite the fact that most indigenous
peoples live in a present far from their hunter-gatherer days, to establish their case
for sustainability they are compelled to choose between two paths, both defined
by outsiders: modernist in which they are backward or postmodernist in which
they are forward.35
Such expectations reinforce the indigenous/scientific knowledge dualism. Prac-
tical scientists use the dualism to get an argument across that science trumps tra-
ditional knowledge. Simultaneously, idealistic conservationists use a dualism to
promote a romanticized version of indigenous lifestyles. The emphasis on differ-
ences inhibits a search for potentially useful similarities and synchronicities in the
two knowledge systems.36
Berkes suggests that the continued referral to two distinct knowledges—one
abstract and the other concrete—can be traced to the writings of Weber and
Nietzsche.37 This system-of-knowledge analysis emphasizes that traditional
knowledge is characterized by its embeddedness in local milieu; boundedness in
space and time; sense of community; and lack of separation between nature and
culture, between subject and object. These features contrast with Western scien-
tific knowledge, which is characterized by disembeddedness; universalism; indi-
vidualism; and nature-culture, subject-object dualisms. Today,Western cultural and
natural preservationists wish to see exotic peoples preserved as idealized, superior
cultures that live in harmony with nature.
A FALSE DICHOTOMY?
Thus, many outsiders, both modernist and postmodernist in outlook, differenti-
ate between indigenous and scientific knowledge in such a way that the two are
pictured only in essentialized forms; the former being organic, holistic, intuitive,
local, practical and egalitarian, and the latter being rationalistic, reductionist, theo-
retical, abstract and objectively verifiable.38 Although it must be acknowledged that
there are numerous substantial differences between the two approaches, there re-
mains the question of whether or not these differences compose a dichotomy that
accurately describes reality—and is therefore useful. Some argue that even the
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bedrock polarities, between oral and written, fixed and flexible, particular and uni-
versal, are too simplistic.39
Emphasizing that traditional knowledge is incompatible with science diverts us
from the task at hand. Ellen argues for an integrated approach that incorporates
both to preserve traditional knowledge.40 Another analyst points to what is missed
in technocratic approaches: “Technocratic arrogance does not recognize that bio-
diversity will not survive without the co-evolving human diversity that is partic-
ular to place, which also includes linguistic diversity, diversity in food and medicinal
systems, and even in the ways we see how culture and nature intermingle.”41
Ironically, science owes its existence to traditional knowledge. Western science’s
birth is usually traced back to the scientific revolution that began in seventeenth-
century Europe, but it did not emerge de novo. It was built on existing folk knowl-
edge, from Europe and (later) its colonies. Thus, horticulture grew out to botany,
alchemy grew out to chemistry, and practical mechanics grew out to physics. The
practice of codifying folk knowledge continued into the nineteenth century and
led to work that, although presented as Western science, resulted from earlier prac-
tices rooted in traditional knowledge.42
Only in the early twentieth-century, when folk knowledge was sufficiently ab-
sorbed into science, was it rejected on the grounds that it was inferior. However,
the historical fact that traditional knowledge is part of what is now labelled mod-
ern or Western science makes it awkward to continue to draw boundaries between
them. Indigenous peoples today can rightfully claim that their knowledge is, in an
organic sense, already part of science.43
Scientific and traditional knowledge are not only connected through historical
practices, they also share a framework of assumptions about how the world is
constructed and how people relate to the world. Human beings, in their percep-
tions and representations of nature, distinguish between empirical facts and the
symbolic and mythical values attached to them. Cultures blur the borders be-
tween the objective and the subjective. However, within science a separation be-
tween its subjective and technical aspects has been introduced to promote an
objective rationality. Nevertheless, science, like any other knowledge system, springs
from and protects the interests of a particular culture. Thus, scientists conform to
an institutionalized model, which is exemplified through practices such as special-
ist terminology, taxonomic nomenclature, methodological protocols, specialist jour-
nals, and so forth. Science and scientific knowledge also serve particular economic
and political interests. This is not to argue that they are contaminated so much as
it is to argue that they are socially embedded. Scientific knowledge is, like tradi-
tional knowledge, a social and cultural as well as a technical practice. Indeed, there
is an extensive literature within science itself, which details its social dimensions
and underpinnings—that of the social construction of science.44
Although the formats of indigenous and scientific knowledge may differ (e.g.,
story telling versus academic publications), the concept of knowledge as a social
practice is just as relevant for science as it is for traditional knowledge. This means
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SYSTEMS 209
that, in the words of Ravetz, “the deepest problems in the understanding of sci-
ence are social rather than epistemological.”45 He argues that in fact science em-
bodies a fundamental paradox between being an enterprise requiring a creative,
personal, and subjective craft, on the one hand, and being an objective, imper-
sonal, and data-manufacturing factory, on the other.
Acceptance of the idea that all knowledge is socially produced softens the du-
alism between indigenous and scientific knowledge. Instead of existing within to-
talizing binary poles, indigenous and scientific knowledge can be more usefully
placed on a continuum, in which at least some differences are not absolute but
relative. Such an approach might be rooted in studies of particular social practices
that are the basis of the differing knowledge systems.46
Feminist analyses contribute to the contemporary critique of an idealized sci-
ence, as noted by Feldman and Welsh: “[G]reater attention to the nuances posed
by feminist perspective can challenge some of the assumptions of a positivist frame-
work [of science], particularly the tendency towards dualist thinking.”47 Much of
the feminist critique of a pure science is based in its earlier critique of the essen-
tialist dichotomy of male–female. Indeed, it has become a commonplace realiza-
tion that the indigenous and the feminine have been portrayed by a hegemonic
scientific-masculine culture as sharing similar characteristics (e.g., being intuitive
and subjective).
Scholars engaging feminist theory argue that the oversimplified rhetoric of in-
digenous versus scientific knowledge fails to address underlying asymmetries of
power—that a distorted power relationship can be held responsible for the con-
tinued marginalization of indigenous peoples and the subordination of their knowl-
edge systems. Ultimately, the continued existence of indigenous knowledge and
the societies they underpin depends on the outcome of the confrontation between
the powerful and the powerless. The question has been framed by Davis: “Can
massive cultural appropriation of the intangible cultural heritage of indigenous
peoples be treated as an autonomous issue, or does it follow more or less inevi-
tably from the power difference between small-scale societies and the world’s in-
dustrial giants?”48
What is needed is to “find ways to give a voice to local knowledges without
smothering them in totalising theories.”49 The fact is that all knowledge systems
are shadowed and even fragmented by power relations, involving differences of
class and race as well as of gender. This has been analyzed as “knowledge politics”
by Stehr.50 The essence of knowledge politics lies in strategic efforts to move the
social control of knowledge into the cultural, economic, and political center of
society, where the main concern then becomes the generation of rules and sanc-
tions to subsume knowledge within property relations.
Totalizing definitions of traditional knowledge are often linked to the distinc-
tiveness of its temporal borders and spatial contexts. However, it is not stationary
or unchanging. Instead, it is syncretic and dynamic, continuously influenced by
outside ideas.51 Traditional knowledge interfaces with other knowledge systems,
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while at the same time it is socially and culturally embedded. Neither indigenous
nor scientific knowledge exist in a silo; both have been transformed through mu-
tual exchanges since at least the fifteenth century.
Arguments to the effect that indigenous peoples are still living in the past and
are unable to incorporate new challenges and situations into their knowledge sys-
tems can be challenged. For example, most of the indigenous communities that
dealt with colonialism were able to survive, however marginally, and they had to
have flexible as well as tenacious knowledge systems to do so. In this sense, indi-
geneity has more to do with its encounter with modernity—through the institu-
tions of the state, capital, science, and property—than with timeless and locally
bounded identities. Notions of embodiment, location, and history are an antidote
to such essentialism.52 Understanding any knowledge production, whether scien-
tific or indigenous, requires an appreciation of the value of historically framed
and situated experiences.
For scholarly disciplines such as STS, the fundamental basis for thinking about
science is that theories, observations, institutions, methods, machines, and net-
works are socially shaped in one way or another. We suggest that by accepting
this episteme it becomes easier to put traditional knowledge on a par with sci-
entific knowledge. The approach of examining science as an active process of
social construction, in which a variety of actors build a heterogeneous network
of relations to make their theories and devices, allows for a questioning of the
conventional narrative of Western scientific truth.53 The fact that traditional knowl-
edge is as innovative as scientific knowledge is already acknowledged in the
literature.54
As we have tried to demonstrate by engaging a critique of the Enlightenment,
the narrative of science has always been part of the general culture of society. The
scientific revolution’s abstract and positivist epistemology was just as much a part
of the colonialist era as was the conquest of vacant land. In considering science as
such a set of situated practices it becomes easier to decenter it and to develop a
more comprehensive framework in which all knowledge systems can be recog-
nized and protected—for what they are.55
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE
Rouse proposes that any knowledge, from an epistemological and political per-
spective, should be defined as a field of practical skills and activities, and ques-
tions the conventional view of science as consistent and coherent. Instead, he
argues that science is a local knowledge “embedded in the ability to employ con-
crete exemplars in the absence of agreed-upon interpretations of them; science is
not dependent upon the particular developments of theoretical explanations [but
depends] on the importance of locally, materially, and socially situated skills and
practices for all understanding and interpretation.”56
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Rouse posits that scientific research cannot and should not become disentan-
gled from “one’s involved, skilful craft knowledge of a field of objects and prac-
tices or from one’s practical needs.”57 He refers to Heidegger’s idea that the
interpretation of opportunities in scientific research requires Vorhabe and Vor-
sicht, the understanding of which is locally situated in that it refers to a partic-
ular configuration of persons, skills, equipment, and so forth. For Rouse, science
is an activity that takes place against a backdrop of localized practices supported
by acquired skills, practices, and equipment (including theoretical models), rather
than an exercise in systemized theorizing.
As such, knowledge is a space in which linkages and then assemblages are es-
tablished. A variety of components—people, skills, knowledge—are linked by so-
cial strategies through which a local space is created where knowledge can flourish.
The innovative aspect of knowledge does not lie in the unique substance of tech-
noscientific knowledge but rather in the innovative assemblage of different knowl-
edge producers who may operate in different spaces. Assemblage is a term Turnbull
borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari, who use it to identify the connection of a
wide variety of components which at first sight seem to be incompatible.58 We
extend Turnbull’s argument that knowledge production is essentially a local pro-
cess by suggesting that such an explicit focus on localness allows for a bridging of
cross-cultural knowledge systems.59 This localness is a proximity or community
of praxis and is not geographically limited.
When the cultural uniqueness of traditional knowledge and the innovative qual-
ity of scientific knowledge are emphasized, the two cannot be compared, let alone
bridged. In STS discourse, science is—just like traditional knowledge—steeped in
culture and social processes. Thus, the defining characters of both scientific and
traditional knowledge can be reduced to a local knowledge space. As Turnbull ar-
gues, through such a reduction, it is easier to “assemble” different knowledge spaces
to create a third space: what he calls trust.60 This third space is relevant when the
process of knowledge production begins in traditional knowledge and is devel-
oped in scientific knowledge.
It is precisely at this point of creating a third knowledge space that we suggest
IPR can play a significant role. For local knowledge spaces to move in place and
time (i.e., from their local site and time of production to other places and times),
a framework is needed. Such a framework should allow for the free movement of
knowledge spaces without powerful restrictions—power in the Foucauldian sense.
For knowledge to become mobile, its producers must have room in which to de-
ploy a variety of social strategies and technical devices for establishing a network
of connections. This assemblage, providing for a safe movement of knowledge,
could be framed through IPR.We elaborate this point with the example of hoodia.
According to our suggestion, it would be erroneous to mark any knowledge
related to hoodia as either traditional or scientific. Whether it is consumed in its
natural setting in the Kalahari or in a laboratory in Pretoria, its appetite-suppressing
and thirst-quenching properties remain the same. Although the San refer to hoodia
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as their “life force” and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
technicians call it the “P57 molecule,” both are referring to the same qualities of
the same flora. This illustrates that the dualism between traditional and scientific
knowledge can come down to what Latour calls articulation, a difference in lan-
guage, or as we have described, two local knowledge spaces.
The difference between traditional and scientific knowledge lies in the “notion
of the articulated propositions.”61 Although P57 relates to the articulation of ap-
petite suppression, hoodia relates to the articulation of life force. However, in the
current IPR model only the articulation of P57 fulfils the criteria of being inno-
vative and is protected by law. Hoodia as life force is what Sunder calls “raw ma-
terial” and it is not protected.62 We suggest that hoodia as a local knowledge space
of life force and hoodia as a local knowledge space of P57 can be linked and as-
sembled. In this respect we argue that the defining character allowing knowledge
to be patented should not be the innovation of scientific practices (miracle mol-
ecules) but the creation of a third space of trust that provides legal recognition
(through IPR) for the historical creation of innovation across local knowledge
spaces. Such a third space for knowledge can cover the entire process of produc-
tion and consumption, from plants in nature to pills in pharmacies.
CONCLUSION
Sunder has proposed to shift poor people’s knowledge from being a subject of IP
to an object of IP by emphasizing the innovative aspect of traditional knowledge,
putting it on a par with scientific knowledge.63 We propose an additional shift: to
define both traditional and scientific knowledge as local knowledge, with both act-
ing as agents of IP. In this sense IPR could become a legal knowledge space that
recognizes and encourages the connection of a multitude of local knowledge spaces.
This legal knowledge space must be characterized by trust (justice) to facilitate
the movement of local knowledge between different places and times.
Thus far it has been argued that traditional knowledge is just as innovative and
evolving as scientific knowledge, and therefore compatible with current IPR re-
quirements. We suggest that the idea of the innovation of science is a descendent
of a dualistic Enlightenment. In positing scientific knowledge as another form of
local knowledge, traditional knowledge can lose its inferior status. The act of as-
semblage between different local knowledge spaces is the innovation. Intellectual
property rights could become a mechanism that frames the full life cycle of inno-
vation, instead of simply validating its last stage (i.e., the technoscientific one). If
the last stage results in a marketable commodity, its owners are the assemblage of
local knowledge spaces that produced it, not just the pharmaceutical companies
that claim its IPR.
A focus on local knowledge allows for recognition that it is heterogeneous, that
it is part of an interconnected world and tied to scientific and technical networks
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through which it interacts.64 Through such interaction, it is possible that knowl-
edge can be simultaneously and dynamically situated in the local and the global,
the historic and the contemporary, the cultural and the legal.
The contemporary lives of most indigenous peoples are a far cry from an ide-
alized past. Imposing unrealistic definitions of an authentic indigeneity not only
distorts their present reality but constrains their social, economic, and political
capabilities. Ultimately, the debate about what is traditional knowledge and how it
differs from scientific knowledge is as much rhetorical as it is substantive; and it
diverts attention away from more important issues at stake, including the sustain-
ability of indigenous peoples and their knowledge and the potentially valuable
contribution of each to sustaining global biological and cultural diversity.
By reducing differences between indigenous and scientific knowledge to a bi-
nary opposition of superiority-inferiority, possible fundamental areas of compat-
ibility are ignored. Instead of marking any piece of knowledge as exclusively
indigenous or scientific, it makes more sense to assume that knowledge has dif-
ferent logics and horizons, depending on the interests it serves or the manner in
which it is generated. Polarities can promote hierarchy and rigidity, whereas as-
semblages can further equity and flexibility. The present polarity between indig-
enous and scientific knowledge does little to protect or enhance traditional
knowledge, which faces a range of threats, including corporate expropriation,
theme park caricature, and extinction.
How might such an approach impact indigenous peoples? The San are an il-
lustrative case. Although most are now poor farm workers, their knowledge of
local nature can still be a valuable resource for them. In addition to serving to
sustain their evolving culture, this knowledge could be leveraged in negotiations
with outsiders interested in profiting from it, applying it to sustainability projects,
or preserving it. In addition, formal recognition of the San claim to a local knowl-
edge space will help them sustain its related social practices, including collective
sharing. However, the principal point would be to treat them as potential partners
in an assemblage of knowledge. This would serve to legitimize them and contrib-
ute to their efforts to move out from under domination by the Europeans and
Africans who historically subjugated, and continue to dominate, them. Of course
such a shift would present a significant challenge to national governments, as well
as to the international IPR regime.
The concept of traditional knowledge limits knowledge to traditional land where
the San lived in the past. However, they have been resettled to land where there
are other ecosystems and where they have developed a new knowledge base for
local biota. A major value of the concept of local knowledge space to resettled
indigenous peoples is that it links knowledge to their new lands. Although tradi-
tional knowledge ties knowledge to traditional places (or historical homelands),
local knowledge space ties it to local places (or present homelands).
Local knowledge space also allows for recognition that different ethnic groups
living on the same land can share rights over it. In areas where different ethnic
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groups have been exchanging local knowledge for generations, it does not seem
just that only one group is designated as its sole custodian, with exclusive owner-
ship rights. The concept of local knowledge argues for a bundle of land and knowl-
edge rights, in which the focus is on sharing through the negotiation of access and
usage rights.
Focusing on the local will also facilitate the (re)discovery of a living law. The
sources of law that regulate IPR are found on library shelves as well as in local
practices and local stories. Incorporating these local practices into a global script
is the challenge. However, as argued throughout this article, by unpacking the as-
sumptions made about traditional and scientific knowledge systems, the gap be-
tween the global and the local, us and them, may be bridgeable. Without such
bridging, traditional knowledge’s fate remains problematic.
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